World-Class Players, But No Quarterfinals. Why?
World-Class Players, But No Quarterfinals. Why?
With Sione Fukofua stepping down as Women’s Eagles Head Coach, perhaps the final punctuation mark is put on what has been a difficult coaching time for the program.
Fukofuka brought some much-needed stability to a team that had seen three coaches run the team over the last four years.
That was partly because the 2021 Women’s Rugby World Cup was held in 2022. Had it been held in 2021, maybe Rob Cain would have stepped away then. Instead he stayed through, 2022 and left in January of 2023. Milton Haig was brought in as a short-term replacement while the search was put on for the long-term solution. When Fukofuka was signed, we at GRR said maybe there will be some continuity now.
There was, and there wasn’t.
Sione Fukofuka, as far as I can tell, is a good guy, a pleasant person to talk to, and someone who knows the game. But he only had basically a year to figure out who his World Cup players were, and then formulate a cohesive World Cup unit. The players might have been cohesive in that they got along … we won’t speculate on that other to say in our observance generally they seemed happy. But in rugby terms this was never a cohesive team.
That was in part due to time, and that was in part due to Fukofuka dithering on some decisions.
Test Match Prep
Inside sources from the team indicated that game-week prep time was not optimal. The players weren’t given sufficient rest time at the right times; practices late in the week, including captains runs, were too much, resulting in the team fading in the second half on game day. The logic seems to be there—the Eagles have tended to fade late in the game—their World Cup was essentially decided in the final 30 minutes of the opening match with England when the Eagles gave up five tries and 29 points. Had they slowed that pace and maybe scored, the points difference chase in Round 3 would have been very different.
But we at GRR weren’t present at trainings. We observed one captain’s run that didn’t seem any rougher than others we’ve seen. So that’s a criticism from a trusted source, but not something we can verify in-person.
However, we can verify that the USA team had not, overall, finished strong in games, and we’re quite willing to hang that on the bench. With some exceptions, the USA bench has performed poorly. We at GRR still call them “reserves” but others like to use the terms “finishers” or “closers” to indicate a more significant role on the team. That’s fair. But the new name comes with added responsibility. Raise the intensity. Be great, at 100 miles an hour, for 20, 15, 10 minutes.
Yes international rugby is a game where you need to conserve your energy for the right moments, but when we see someone jogging to get back on D following a line break, and that player has been on the field for three minutes, our blood boils. We brought up this criticism in 2022, and it holds today. With some exceptions, the bench isn’t good enough.
Now, who gets those players ready? Who gets them to understand their responsibilities? Two reserves took the field against Samoa and crossed the tryline as upright as a scarecrow bolted to a stick and were held-up in-goal; who lets them get away with that in training? Who picks the players on the bench? I will tell you who it wasn’t; it wasn’t the captain or the experienced players or the starters. It’s the coaches. It’s the Head Coach.
Personnel
Fukofuka did not have four years to figure out and settle on his best 23 for the team. However, much of that lineup was pretty clear. He still had some questions to answer as he came into the job: lock, one flanker, scrumhalf, flyhalf, and the deep three.
Of those, Fukofuka did a solid job figuring out scrumhalf and while we ended up with sort of rotating #9s with Cassidy Bargell and Olivia Ortiz, both are good and they’re not so different as to change the character of the team. Flanker was obvious to pretty much everyone; Fred Tafuna. And yet Fukofuka continued to try to shoehorn Georgie Perris-Redding into that role. Perris-Redding has a lot of positives, but she isn’t the game-changer Tafuna is. Why Tafuna didn’t start against England is a mystery, because she started the next two games, scored six tries in those two games, and was named player of the game in both matches.
In the end, Perris-Redding, unfortunately, was injured in the first 20 minutes against England and Tafuna played the rest of the game.
One wonders how the selections would have gone had Perris-Redding been healthy.
Getting a lock to partner with Hallie Taufoou was a big victory for Fukofuka. He stuck with and worked with Erica Jarrell-Searcy and took a player who, frankly, didn’t look like she could hang physically or from a fitness standpoint and (whether it was Sale Sharks or the USA coaches or someone else) she blossomed, becoming one of the better players on the team. Flyhalf was a series of dithering and experimentation before Fukofuka finally settled on McKenzie Hawkins. We at GRR are big McKenzie Hawkins fans, but we also have to recognize that her kicking from the hand is not her best event. In the end, against Samoa, Fukofuka brought on Gabby Cantorna to handle that aspect of play, which of course changed the lineup around.
Fuofuka didn’t fix it with a fullback who could kick for distance, and maybe there his problem was … who? It was a “hope for the best” situation that never really got solved.
On the Deep Three, we saw lots of changes, and a curious devotion to a couple of players who just aren’t consistently strong enough to be there. The changes had to be made, but the changes were made in the World Cup, not before. Cheta Emba? Needed time and minutes. Eric Coulibaly? Hugely inexperienced but so much upside, should have been on the field as much as possible. Emily Henrich? Saved the USA’s bacon multiple times, got moved around, and kept smiling and making meters. At fullback, as we said, we had no big boomer as a kicker, and some problems with open-field tackling. The player of the future needed either to be protected and played sparingly, or played a lot. Fukofuka went for a middle ground with Sariah Ibarra that was almost the worst of both worlds. He’s lucky she’s resilient and smart.
Tactics
Tries are tries, but some tries are more equal than others. If you score a lot through your forwards, generally that means that it takes a lot of time and effort, bashing away at the line, and often in the middle of the field, as well. If you score a lot in the backs, especially from long range, that’s wonderful and exciting, but if you face a very good defense or play on a tight field or a wet field, you need something more.
So where the tries come from can tell us something. A good spread of who scored the tries shows versatility and, when it’s needed, an ability to score quickly.
The USA came into the World Cup with a fully professional backline and tons of experience, but couldn’t score in the backs. Here are your USA try-scorers in the World Cup:
Freda Tafuna, Flanker, 6
Erica Jarrell-Searcy, Lock, 3
Hope Rogers, Prop, 3
Keia Mae Sagapolu, Prop 1
Erica Coulibaly, Wing, 1
Olivia Ortiz, Scrumhalf, 1
Cassidy Bargell, Scrumhalf, 1
Sixteen tries scored, of which 13 were by forwards, and two by scrumhalves who picked up at the base of the ruck and sniped through a gap from short range—basically a forwards try. The one try from a wing was also short-range, with the ball being sent wide after the forwards worked it close.
There were zero long-range or open-field tries by backs. Is that a failure of execution by those backs? At times, sure. But it is also a failure of tactics. In a game where they needed to run up a massive score, the USA couldn’t do it to the level they needed (against Samoa) partly because their backline attack was unsophisticated in its construction. Look at the coaching staff—Fukofuka, Sarah Chobot, Mel Bosman … all former forwards.
How Do You Solve a Problem Like Ilona?
Ilona Maher is a phenomenon and has done massive work in exposing the game of rugby to young girls and young women. But being a phenomenon can bring baggage. The thing about Maher is that her best abilities as a rugby player are defense and work in contact. She’s a power runner in 7s and brilliant at it. She’s world-class.
But coming into the USA 15s team she was coming as … a phenomenon. That is not saying she was a prima donna at all. She was coming in to play for the United States, but how do you handle that? Do you make her to focus of your attack? Do you make her a decoy because everyone assumes she’s the focus of your attack? Should she create and pass, or truck it up and draw attention? Should she finish?
Her presence on this team put me in mind of two men’s players for the USA: Nate Ebner and Takudzwa Ngwenya. Ebner was brought onto the 2016 Olympic team but not with a clear idea of where he would fit or what he should do. Should you protect him a bit because you don’t want to ruin his NFL career? Should be be there as a decoy? He’s a big star but, really, is he a reserve?
Ngwenya produced one of the greatest tries in American rugby history. He was a worldwide … what’s that word again? But his overall strike rate for the Eagles was about one try every three games. For a top wing, that’s not high (Eagle record-holder Vaea Anitoni is better than one try every two games). Why? Because after he became a star in 2007 Ngwenya wasn’t always with the team, and how he fit into the Eagles setup changed each time he assembled. In addition, you need a lot of other things to go right for a wing to score tries for you.
Maher is in this same category. There wasn’t enough time to build an attack plan around her, and so we saw a player who the fans wanted to see run … run just sometimes. Tackles, jackles (yes, a lot of those) we saw. Technically, on defense especially, she was very strong.
Maher was among the team leaders in meters gained against England and against Samoa, but not Australia—there she mostly set up Henrich, who led all players with 94 meters gained. Neither Maher nor Henrich were among the top carriers throughout the tournament.
Hope Rogers carried 48 times for about 260 meters. Tafuna carried 44 times (despite being a reserve the first game) for 352 (!). Rachel Johnson carried 50 times.
Now, this isn’t rare that forwards carry more, but what this illustrates to us again is that this was a forward-heavy offense. And yet you had Ilona Maher on the team. You had Alev Kelter. You had Emily Henrich. For Maher specifically, there just wasn’t a clear demonstration of what she was set up to do … such as run her on some attacking lines early, force the defense to respect her, and then run a play-action to go wide.
Ultimately
Ultimately that meant that we saw a team that didn’t leverage all of its talent.
The Future
US coaches who know the US players. Plan long-term so you have a unified team going into key tournaments (RWC qualification; RWC performance). Raise the standards and expectations of players 16 through 30. And 31 through 50 for that matter. And 51-100.
Time for a new coach to figure out what that coach has and what to do with the talent available.
Serious widespread scouting and development of talented young players who are developed in the USA. Overseas players have not made enough of an impact to warrant the time and effort.
And we need a serious look at tactics, skill development, and standards. The USA has the athletes, the talent, the knowledge. Can we now set up all of these, and the coaches, to succeed?